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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal comprises of the review of a grant of motion to dismiss by the lower
Court. !,[T]he purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of
the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a case." Whipple v.
Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220(Utah 1996). Under Utah R. Civ.P. 8(a), the
only requirements for a complaint are that it contains a "short plain statement...showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment for relief." Here,
Appellees have formulated their issues for purposes of establishing facts and resolving
issues of the case which carry merit in contradiction to the proper review for a grant of
motion to dismiss.
Appellees also erroneously assume that no inferences should be drawn in light
favorable to Appellant under Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, fl8, 212 P.3d 535.
Generally, when an appellate court reviews the district court's decision to
grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, "we accept as true all material allegations contained in the
complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." West v.
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994)...When reviewing
claims of defamation, however, a reviewing court takes a slightly different
approach. As we stated in O'Connor v. Birmingham, "the presence of the
First Amendment demands a subtle although significant variation in the
treatment of inferences drawn from undisputed facts." 2007 UT 58, ^24,
165 P.3d 1214.
Jacob at ^fl8(emphasis added). Here, the Appellees attempt a prima facie case that
inferences may not be drawn in light favorable to Appellant because, as part of their
arguments, they allege that all causes of action should be labeled as defamation-related,
regardless of the oodles of non-defamation related conduct in the Appellant's complaint.
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Any conduct unrelated to protected free speech and genuine governmental
petitioning should nevertheless be considered under Miller v. Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT
App 80, Tf6, 110 P.3d 144 (holding "grant of a motion to dismiss is affirmed only if, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged" and "all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff").
In citing Miller, Appellant intended primarily to prevent Appellees from drawing
inferences in light least favorable to Appellant. Assuming arguendo that inferences
drawn in light favorable to the Appellant be withheld, Appellees nonetheless continue to
draw inferences in light least favorable to Appellant to the extent of misrepresenting
certain facts. Accordingly, in the very least, inferences drawn by Appellees continuously
throughout their briefs and inferences relied upon in the Order, in light least favorable to
the Appellant should be disregarded.

2

ARGUMENT
By design, the Appellees' briefs embody two distinct approaches to this appeal:
(1) addressing the issues on appeal-the application of Jensen and Afoerr-Immunity; and
(2) relying on alternative grounds for affirming the lower Court's dismissal of all claims
with prejudice. Neither approach sufficiently supports a basis for affirming the grant for a
motion to dismiss claims five through nine of the complaint

I.
DESPITE APPELLEES' RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS INITIAL BRIEF,
JENSEN IS STILL NARROW IN ITS APPLICATION AND NOERR-JMMUNITY IS
NOT ABSOLUTE
A.

Jensen Does Not Apply to Conduct or Causes of Action Unrelated to
Defamation

Appellees' briefs attempt to distort and complicate the issue of whether Jensen
applies to causes of action five through nine of the Second Amended Complaint
("complaint"). However, regardless of the number of times Appellees briefs regurgitate
that Courts "pay little heed to the labels placed on a particular claim," or "the statute of
limitations for defamation governs claims based on the same operative facts that would
support a defamation action," the issue is simple: Was Jensen intended to be construed
broadly to causes of action and conduct unrelated to defamation? Appellees have
attempted to accuse Appellant Bates of artfully pleading for purposes of circumventing
the statute of limitations for defamation. No such attempts have been made, including the
erroneous accusation by Appellees that causes of action five through nine of the
complaint are disguised claims of defamation. In Jensen v. Sawyers, the Utah Supreme
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Court explained that "our discussion bears on the narrow issue of whether the defamation
statute of limitations should apply to claims of false light invasion of privacy." 2005 UT
81, Tf57, 130 P.3d 325. "We are cautious about describing in any detail the scope or
contours of actions for false light invasion of privacy that do not involve allegations of
defamatory statements." Id. at |58. Accordingly, any conduct that does not involve
defamatory statements, which supports a cause of action unrelated to defamation, is
precluded for consideration of a one-year time-bar under Jensen.
Any fair reading of the complaint would suggest that there is much conduct which
cannot be related to, or characterized as defamatory statements. However, because
Appellees continually disregard the existence of conduct unrelated to free speech or
defamation throughout the course of this litigation, Appellant reiterates the same herein.
The WFRMLS and REALTOR associations purposefully implemented changes in
their "Policy and Procedures Manual" to discourage and punish use ofUtahMLS.com by
real estate agents and brokers who were already compelled to join REALTOR
associations for access to the REALTOR MLS. The new policies also prohibited the use
of the term "MLS" in an internet domain name. R.270. WFRMLS suspended and blocked
Bates's access primarily because of the traction gained by his competing website to
WFRMLS, UtahMLS.com. James Naccarato, agent to WFRMLS, used the new policies
as leverage for Bates to adhere to the new unfair policies by refusing REALTOR benefits
unless he was completely compliant to the policies. R.272-273. As a result of WFRMLS,
SLBR, NWAR, and UCAR tactics, UtahMLS.com lost momentum because new policies
implied to REALTOR members that use of another MLS exchange that did not strictly
4

conform to the policies would be grounds for termination from the organization and legal
action. R.274. On October 9, 2009, Brad Baldwin, agent to WFRMLS contacted Bates
stating that the value in his domain name UtahMLS.com has depreciated in light of the
unfair policies, and that WFRMLS would like to buy it for $2,000.00. R.274. This
indicates that the policies held ulterior motives to injure, and take advantage of Bates.
SLBR made public, Bates's expulsion from REALTOR organizations contrary to
bylaws, procedure and policies of REALTOR organizations. R.275. Expulsion was
announced by Appellees Thomas Johnson and Jillinda Bowers. Although the statements
are speech, they indicate that actions by both Jillinda Bowers and Thomas Johnson were
carried out to Bates's detriment more of which is expected through discovery in this
litigation. Furthermore, Jillinda Bowers was a UAR board of director, President of the
SLBR, former competitor of Bates and she was violating policies and procedures in
making expulsion from REALTORS public. Furthermore, her statements indicated that
Bates was expelled without cause, hearing or right of appeal as required by policies and
procedures of REALTOR

associations. R.275-276. Severance from

WFRMLS

accompanied the expulsion from REALTOR associations. Accordingly, Bates was unable
to engage in his business and career as a licensed principal broker. His business
operations were paralyzed. Unable to operate under his license, he allowed his license to
expire. R.277. Appellees caused that Bates's license be involuntarily renewed. Said
action was contrary to policies, procedures and laws dictating the management of
principal broker's licenses. R.277. Defendants Steinegal and Smalley both acknowledged
that the UDRE lacked subject matter jurisdiction to investigate commission disputes
5

between Bates and his licensees on multiple occasions. R.277. Despite this, they caused
and allowed investigations against Bates to ensue. Regardless of economic reasons that
Allpro was going out of business, the proceedings were aimed at, and succeeded in
destroying Bates's career as a principal broker. R.277-279. The REALTOR controlled
UDRE Commission continued to prosecute Bates despite the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction until intervention occurred from the only person independent of the
REALTOR associations—Judge Eklund. R.278. Ryan Kirkham, then vice-president of
SLBR indicated that the REALTORS knew fully that UDRE lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. R.279.
Equity Real Estate ("ERE") joined in the onslaught to destroy Bates's career. It
targeted licensees under Bates's principal broker's license to dismember their contractual
and economic relations under Bates. Licensees were contacted individually for purposes
of inducing agents into leaving Bates and offering incentives of $100 per transaction of
agents induced by ERE agents to quisle. R.280-283.
The above facts are unrelated to defamatory conduct and stand independent of any
claims of defamation for purposes establishing claims for unfair business practices,
improper use of legal proceedings, tortious interference with contractual relations,
tortious interference with economic relations, and unlawful conspiracy to destroy the
trade, business or occupation of another. Accordingly, because the Jensen court
acknowledged that its holding "bears on the narrow issue of whether the defamation
statute of limitations should apply to claims of false light invasion of privacy," and the
Court is "cautious about describing in any detail the scope or contours of actions for false
6

light invasion of privacy that do not involve allegations of defamatory statements/1 the
conduct unrelated to defamation, as pleaded in the complaint is precluded for
consideration of a one-year time-bar under Jensen. 2005 UT 81, ^fl|57-59, 130 P.3d 325.
Ultimately, statements made by Appellees Bowers, Thomas Johnson, Steinegal,
Smalley and others were not pleaded solely for purposes of claiming defamation. The
statements indicate that the speakers were aware of actions taken against Bates, and
suggest that participation by the speakers against Bates was not merely coincidental, nor
was it insignificant. Accordingly, statements pleaded in the complaint also fall within the
scope of causes of action five through nine of the complaint, and if for no other reason,
justify the necessity of this Court allowing this litigation to proceed.
Accordingly, despite Appellees' attempts to erroneously shroud this law suit in the
First Amendment and characterize Bates's complaint as mislabeling causes of action to
circumvent the statute of limitations, the allegations made in Bates's complaint in
actuality support each cause of action pleaded for purposes of surviving a 12(b)(6)
motion. Therefore, the lower Court's Order improperly applied a one-year time-bar to
claims five through nine of the complaint and this Court should reverse and remand the
lower Court's order dismissing all claims with prejudice under Jensen.

7

B.

Noerr-Immumty is Not Absolute in its Application to State Claims, and
Regardless of Appellees' Absolute Version of Noerr, Facts Relied upon by
Appellees Are Misrepresented or Presented in Light Least Favorable to
Appellant
Appellees' responses to Appellant's initial brief also appear misguided and

falsely premised with respect to Noerr. For instance, Steinegal and Smalley's brief argues
that the UDRE and the Real Estate Commission are governmental entities, as if Mr. Bates
argued the contrary. And, UAR and Kyler's brief asserts that application of Noerr to state
claims are identical to that of Federal Antitrust, while requesting the Court make an
absolutist application only seen by the United States Supreme Court in Federal Antitrust
cases. This appeal requests a Noerr analysis by this Court under a standard for
correctness. And, Mr. Bates's initial brief, although wrongfully characterized by
Appellees, attempts only to present the law of Afoerr-immunity to this Court as it
currently stands. Accordingly, cases like Astoria and McDonaldwere discussed purely to
lay the foundation and framework carelessly overlooked by Appellees.
Despite the arguments made by Appellees' briefs, the issues with respect to Noerr
remain simple: (1) does the Appellees' conduct fall within the scope of Afoerr-immunity?
And, (2) if any conduct does fall within the scope of Afoerr-immunity, does the sham
exception apply in providing an exception to Noerr application?
Appellees have requested this Court grant blanket application of Afoerr-immunity
regardless of conduct undeserving or unrelated to the First Amendment. Perhaps
unintentionally while giving support for defenses raised, the Appellees miss the
counterproductive nature of their arguments. Appellees would have Afoerr-immunity
8

protect them from the a claim of abuse of process because they engaged in so-called
political activity, while simultaneously preventing Appellant Bates from engaging in
litigation for purposes of protecting his rights and redressing damages unquestionably
caused by Appellees.
In fact, according to the recitation of law by Appellees' briefs, the cause of action
for abuse of process no longer exists. Governmental agencies, regardless of whether they
act within enabling statutes, can engage in public investigations, and hold hearings all
under the umbrella of Noerr. And, despite Commissions having loyalties to private trade
associations over those of the public, acting without authority and with financial interests
of their own, continue to have immunity. Under the Appellees' version of Noerr,
campaigns to interfere with economic relationships are immunized regardless of whether
the interference remains unrelated to any governmental activity. And, private trade
associations can modify and act contrary to policies and procedures to maintain unfair
practices and smother any competitive threats to their monopolies over an industry.
Despite the Appellees' absolutist recitation of TVoerr-immunity, Abuse of Process
claims are still recognized and entertained by Utah Courts. In fact, many Courts have
recognized that Afoerr-immunity is not all-encompassing, contrary to Appellees'
assertions. It was the Noerr Court that first pointed out that "[t]here may be situations in
which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action,
is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly
with business relationships of a competitor^] Eastern RR Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 144(1961). Later on, the United States Supreme Court opined that
9

[w]e cannot agree with petitioner's absolutist position that the Noerr
doctrine immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to
influence governmental action. If all such conduct were immunized then,
for example, competitors would be free to enter into horizontal price
agreements as long as they wish to propose that price as an appropriate
level for governmental ratemaking or price supports...Firms could claim
immunity for boycotts or horizontal output restrictions on the ground that
they are intended to dramatize the plight of their industry and spur
legislative action. Immunity might even be claimed for anticompetitive
mergers on the theory that they give the merging corporations added
political clout. Nor is it necessarily dispositive that packing the
Association's meeting may have been the most effective means of securing
government action, for one could imagine situations where the most
effective means of influencing government officials is bribery, and we have
never suggested that that kind of attempt to influence the government
merits protection. We thus conclude that the Noerr immunity of
anticompetitive activity intended to influence the government depends not
only on its impact, but also on the context and nature of the activity.
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503-504(1988). And in
California Motor, the Court stated that "[t]here are many other forms of illegal and
reprehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative or judicial process and
which may result in antitrust violations." California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513(1972)(implying that absolute immunity not afforded where
abuse of process is present). And finally, when addressing the applicability of First
Amendment protections under the Petition Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
"[although the values in the right of petition is an important aspect of self-government
are beyond question, it does not follow that the Framers of the First Amendment believed
that the Petition Clause provided absolute immunity from damages for libel" McDonald
v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483 (1985)(indicating that state claims not immunized under the
First Amendment).
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In McDonald, a defendant was requesting absolute immunities under the
petitioning clause for statements made in a letter directed to the President. In response the
Court, referring to the 1845 decision in White v. Nicholls, responded:
Nothing presented to us suggests that the Court's decision not to recognize
an absolute privilege in 1845 should be altered; we are not prepared to
conclude, 140 years later, that the Framers of the First Amendment
understood the right to petition to include an unqualified right to express
damaging falsehoods in exercise of that right. Nor do the Court's decisions
interpreting the Petition Clause in contexts other than defamation indicate
that the right to petition is absolute. For example, filing a complaint in court
is a form of petitioning activity; but "baseless litigation is not immunized
by the First Amendment right to petition." Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc.
v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743(1983); accord, California Motor Transport Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513(1972). Similarly, petitions to the
President that contain intentional and reckless falsehoods "do not enjoy
constitutional protection," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75(1964),
and may, as in White v. Nicholls, be reached by...libel. To accept
petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition Clause to
special First Amendment status. The Petition Clause, however, was inspired
by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to
speak, publish, and assemble. See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389
U.S. 217, 222(1967). These First Amendment rights are inseparable,
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530(1945), and there is no sound basis for
granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to
the President than other First Amendment expressions.
McDonald at 483.
Regardless of the Appellees' overly broad version of Afoerr-immunity, their
argument nonetheless fails because it erroneously disregards significant facts or
circumstances surrounding the case, and it assumes specifics which are untrue and
contrary to facts alleged in the complaint. For instance, Appellees assert that the
gravamen of the complaint is grounded in constitutionally protected petitioning activity.
As demonstrated herein above, any fair reading of the complaint would suggest that much
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of the conduct alleged, and to be discovered, is unrelated and independent of petitioning.
Furthermore, Appellees assert that the petition was directed towards the government. The
petition requested that Bates be expelled from REALTOR organizations—a request
directed towards REALTOR organizations. All other requests made were expressly
outside of the UDRE's subject matter jurisdiction and were only entertained because of
the influence REALTOR organizations had over the UDRE and Commission. The
Appellees themselves acknowledged that they would have to circumvent the law to
punish Mr. Bates.
Also, Appellees erroneously assert that Bates has no cause of action because he
gained a favorable result in the administrative proceedings. To the contrary, Bates gained
a favorable result because no action should have been taken against him by the UDRE in
the first place. Regardless of the outcome, the administrative proceeding was improperly
used to interfere with Bates's relationships and destroy his career. Bates was forced to
defend against the wrongful accusations made by Appellees, which caused the Appellant
great harm.
Additionally, Appellees' argument disregards that Appellees acted with malice
when carrying out their conduct. Bates operated the largest real estate brokerage in Utah.
ERE, the UDRE Commission, and the Board of Directors for REALTOR organizations
all knew that their businesses would benefit if Bates was no longer operating a brokerage.
Appellants Smalley, Johnson and other individuals who will be witnesses in this
litigation, personally told Bates that Appellees intended to remove him as a competitor,
and circumvent the law to do so. Appellees and others were all aware that REALTOR
12

organizations, including CEO's Kyler, Kholer and Ostermiller, wanted Bates removed
from the industry. Mr. Bates founded and operated the primary competing MLS website
to WFRMLS. The WFRMLS is the REALTOR organization's chief source of revenue. It
is the only reason real estate agents and brokers in Utah join REALTOR organizations.
And Bates's MLS threatened that chief source of revenue. REALTOR members and
directors sitting on the UDRE Commission disliked Mr. Bates. While on REALTOR
Board of Directors, Bates refused to support advertising campaigns favoring specific
brokers, some of which occupied UDRE Commission. Accordingly, the pleaded facts
suggest that Appellees acted with malice when carrying out conduct against Bates.
Furthermore, Appellees' argument assumes that the petitioning conduct was not an
attempt to circumvent the law. Appellees' assume that Rl62-7-1 contained an exception
to the provision barring subject matter jurisdiction for the UDRE over commission
disputes. No exception existed. The petition requested two things: (1) expulsion of Bates
from REALTOR associations and (2) alleging that certain individuals were owed
commissions for sales.
Section 61-2-11 is relied upon by Appellees' argument, which rests on whether
61-2-11 provided necessary subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of providing a basis
for which the proceedings brought against Bates were not a sham, and were not abused
process. However, Judge Eklund points out that "it is critically significant that Rl62-7-1
which governs this proceeding contains no exception to the provision that the Division
will not entertain complaints between licensees regarding claims to commissions." As
Judge Eklund pointed out in pages 19-22 of the decision, the petition contained specific
13

allegations of commissions owed, and beyond that only general allegations under §61-211, citing no specifics. Bates has correspondence between persons and REALTOR
leaders indicating that Smalley and others were going on fishing expeditions, seeking out
evidence of dishonest dealings because no persons presented the UDRE with complaints
or evidence of crimen falsi. Because there was no exception to Rl62-7-1, and yet
Appellees attempted to fit within the exception contained in an older version of Rl 62-71, it is clear that the administrative proceeding was simply a sham, and abuse of process
by Appellees.
Objectively, a reasonable person cannot expect to gain a favorable result by
petitioning a governmental entity lacking the subject matter jurisdiction to redress their
grievances. Subjectively, the Appellants knew they could and would not prevail because
they attempted to fit within an exception contained in an older version of the law without
actually making allegations unrelated to commissions, while also acknowledging that the
UDRE lacked authority to entertain commission disputes. Appellees nonetheless carried
out the improper use of administrative proceedings because they were aware of the
interference it would provide to Bates's career, regardless of the outcome. Therefore, any
conduct that fits within the scope of Afoerr-immunity also qualifies under the "sham"
exception.
Either the Appellees abused process, or they did not. Either they interfered with
Appellant's contractual and economic relations, or not. Either their business practices
violated the unfair practices act, or they did not. Under the proper scope of the First
Amendment, their conduct cannot be immunized unless it is protected. Illegal and non14

political activity cannot be protected under Noerr. This is not a new issue, as asserted by
the Appellees, but rather a fundamental principle of law carried by the First Amendment.
If findings of fact support the allegations and remaining causes of action of the
complaint, Appellees' conduct cannot be immunized.
Accordingly, despite Appellees' attempts to erroneously shroud this law suit in the
First Amendment by mislabeling their own tortious conduct, the allegations made in the
complaint in actuality support each cause of action pleaded for purposes of surviving a
12(b)(6) motion. Therefore, the lower Court's Order improperly applied Afoerr-immunity
to claims five through nine of the complaint and this Court should reverse and remand the
lower Court's order to dismiss all claims with prejudice under Noerr.

II. IF ENTERTAINED BY THIS COURT, ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS
PRESENTED BY APPELLEES' BRIEFS NONETHELESS FAIL TO PROVIDE THIS
COURT WITH ADEQUATE BASIS FOR AFFIRMATION OF LOWER COURT'S
ORDER DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE
The remaining issues raised by the Appellees' briefs hinge solely on whether this
Court elects to affirm the lower Court's dismissal on alternative grounds. "[A]n appellate
court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or
theory apparent on the record," Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^[13, 52 P.3d 1158
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). While this Court possesses the authority
to affirm on alternative grounds, it is "not obligated to exercise this authority." O'Connor
v. Birmingham, 2007 UT 58, ^{23, 165 P.3d 1214.
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Appellant respectfully requests this Court decline Appellees' invitation to exercise
the authority to affirm on alternative grounds because of the factually intense nature of
this litigation. This appeal reviews the lower Court's grant for a motion to dismiss.
Despite that, the Appellees continually attempt to address facts and merits of the case,
forgetting that no discovery, finding of facts, or pleadings beyond that of an initial
12(b)(6) motion has occurred. For instance, most of the Appellees arguments rely on
inferences made, primarily in light least favorable to Bates. These inferences are
unnecessary because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow the parties to avoid
inferences and find actual facts through discovery. Ultimately, this case has merit. The
time to address the merits is not during a 12(b)(6) motion, but rather throughout the
litigation process.
Appellees offer this Court no shortage of alternative issues to affirm the lower
Court's order. First, WFRMLS asserts that its conduct is time-barred under a three-year
statute of limitations. However, WFRMLS's conduct stretches to late 2009, from
discriminatorily severing MLS access in December of 2008 to enforcing policies to keep
the value of UtahMLS.com low and offering to purchase the domain at an admittedly
depreciated $2,000.
Second, Appellees assert that the complaint fails to comply with Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 8. Any fair reading of the complaint demonstrates that facts averred
provide Appellees with adequate notice for purposes of satisfying the pleading
requirements under Rule 8. A dismissal under Rule 8 is not justified because the
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allegations of the complaint do not clearly demonstrate that the Appellant does not have a
claim and the Appellant has the right to prove his case under Utah law.
Third, Appellees assert that Appellant has no claims under the Utah Unfair
Practices Act and that the complaint fails to properly plead claims under the Act. Neither
is true. The Unfair Practices Act does provide a cause of action for conduct carried out
against the Appellant and the complaint properly pleads the unfair methods of
competition Appellees carried out against Bates.
Fourth, Brady Long dba ERE's brief asserts that he was not involved in improper
use of legal proceedings and that Bates lacks standing for the remaining claims brought
against ERE. A fair reading of the complaint indicates that both arguments are without
merit.
Lastly, SLBR's brief asserts that a one-year time-bar under Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act ("URNPCA") precludes claims brought against Appellees.
However, Appellant pleaded no claims under URNPCA in the complaint, and
accordingly, the Act is inapplicable.
Assuming arguendo that this Court elects to entertain Appellees' invitations to
consider alternative grounds for affirmation, no issue raised by the Appellees sufficiently
supports a basis for affirming the grant for a motion to dismiss in this case.
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A.

The Three-Year Statute of Limitations Does Not Preclude Claims Made
Against WFRMLS Because Its Conduct Occurred Less Than Three Years
Before The Filing of This Action

WFRMLS asserts that claims brought are time-barred under a three-year
limitations period. In support of this defense, WFRMLS relies solely on two dates
referred to in the complaint—April and June 2006. However, WFRMLS's argument
conveniently disregards all other claims alleged in the complaint that occurred within the
three-year period preceding this action.
Brad Baldwin, agent to WFRMLS carried out illegal conduct against Bates as late
as October 9, 2009, when offering to purchase UtahMLS.com for a low and admittedly
depreciated $2,000. WFRMLS inappropriately severed Bates's access to MLS listing
contrary to policies and procedures as late as December 2008. And, WFRMLS's
continues enforcing policies to keep the value of UtahMLS.com depreciated, interfere
with former and potential customers to UtahMLS.com, and maintain improper control
over the real estate industry.
Furthermore, WFRMLS is owned and operated by REALTOR organizations,
located in same building, shares employees and operates under same policies and
procedures as REALTORS. WFRMLS, Appellees and other REALTOR organizations
acted in concert, as agents one to another to conveniently dispose of a Bates as a
competitor.
Accordingly, Appellee's argument fails to satisfy "the burden of proving every
element necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars [Appellant's] claims,"
and the complaint nonetheless alleges conduct within the limitations period. Conder v.
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Hunt, 2000 UT App 105,f 14, 1 P.3d 558. Therefore, this defense raised by WFRMLS
fails to provide this Court with adequate alternative grounds for affirming the lower
Court's order dismissing all claims with prejudice.

B.

The Complaint Meets Rule 8 Pleading Requirements for Utah Law

Appellees erroneously assert that the complaint fails to meet the pleading
standards under Rule 8. Notice is the touchstone of Rule 8's pleading requirements and
the complaint in this law suit was drafted with this objective in mind. The complaint was
written to comply with Rule 8, and there is nothing inconsistent between the minimal
pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8 and the overarching requirement that the
complaint be written in terms that plead sufficient facts to make out a claim, so as to
reduce the risk of a successful motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Appellees have pointed out the likeness of Utah's Rule 8 to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted this rule in Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), and held that a complaint should not be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) unless it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 45-46. Since that time,
Federal Courts have heightened those pleading standards: [A] pleading must contain a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief..."
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations,"
but it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).
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However, the Utah Supreme Court has declined to adopt the Federal standard for
Rule 8 and has instead retained the "short and plain statement" first promulgated in
Conley. See Peak Alarm Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2010 UT 22, 1j 70 n.13, 243 P.3d
1221. Furthermore, in considering the standards by which the Court is to address a
12(b)(6) motion under Rule 8, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
the purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency
of the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a
case. We also note that a dismissal is justified only when the allegations of
the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim.
See Utah R.Civ.P. 8(a)(stating that the only requirements of a complaint are
that it contain a "short and plain statement...showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment for the relief).
Whipple v. American Forklrr. Co., 910 P. 2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996)(citations omitted).
Thus, while the Appellees correctly assert that Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...,"
they neglect to acknowledge that the level of specificity varies from case to case
depending on what constitutes sufficient notice to enable a defendant to formulate a
response of pleading. The twenty-two (22) pages of facts in the complaint clearly indicate
UAR's, Kyler's and other Appellees' involvement, the facts surrounding their
involvement and the controlling relationship between REALTOR organizations and other
Appellees in the law suit.
All Defendants are directly connected with UAR, and acted as agents of the UAR.
Defendant Kyler is CEO and general counsel for the UAR. Additionally, he was/is a
partner, with Defendants Michael Ostermiller and Bryan Kohler, in KKO Lawyers. Both
Kyler and Mr. Ostermiller participated in the November 3, 2011 meeting. Kyler
20

participated in meetings and had other communications with other individuals in
conspiring the destruction of the Appellant's career.
When reading each allegation with these reasonable considerations in mind, the
complaint does not fail to provide Appellees functional notice of the nature and extent of
the claims against them as is necessary for the Appellees' to formulate an appropriate
defense. In fact, a reading of the Appellees' answers to the complaint would suggest the
same. And, other issues raised by Appellees' in this appeal demonstrate that they are fully
aware of the conduct alleged against them, and the nature and circumstances of their
actions, even relying on arguments in the nature of a demurer. Ultimately, a dismissal is
not justified because the allegations of the complaint do not clearly demonstrate that the
Appellant does not have a claim, the Appellant has the right to prove his case under
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977)(holding "in case of doubt, the
doubt should be resolved in allowing the challenged party the opportunity of at least
attempting to prove his right to recover."), and Appellees were provided with sufficient
notice to the facts and circumstances surrounding their illegal conduct as required by
Utah law. See Whipple at 1220.
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C.

Utah Unfair Practices Act Provides a Cause of Action for Conduct Carried
Out Against Appellant and Complaint Adequately Pleads Said Cause of
Action

Next, Appellees erroneously assert that Appellant has no claims under the Utah
Unfair Practices Act and that the complaint fails to properly plead claims under the Act.
The Unfair Practices Act was enacted to "safeguard the public against the creation,
or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting
unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or
prevented." U.C.A. § 13-5-17. Furthermore, the Act shall be "liberally construed that its
beneficial purposes may be subserved." Id. The Act creates a cause of action against
competitors engaging in unfair practices. It provides:
Any person or the state of Utah may maintain an action to enjoin a
continuance of any act in violation of this chapter, and, if injured by the act,
for the recovery of damages. If, in such action, the court finds that the
defendant is violating or has violated any of the provisions of this chapter,
it shall enjoin the defendant from a continuance of the violation. It is not
necessary that actual damages to the plaintiff be alleged or proved.
U.C.A. § 13-5-14 (emphasis added).
Appellees have argued that the Unfair Practices Act fails to provide Appellant
with a cause of action because the complaint alleges no price discrimination. Their
argument rests solely on the Federal District Court's rationale that the Act is limited to
price discrimination in MacArthur v. San Juan County, 416 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Utah
2005). However, the Act itself, and Utah State Courts have acknowledged that the Act
reaches further than price discrimination, but includes unfair methods of competition.
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For instance, U.C.A. § 13-5-2.5(2) grants the Division of Consumer Protection
authority to "prevent persons . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce
or trade." Section 2.5(1) also makes clear that "Unfair methods of competition in
commerce or trade are unlawful and shall be enjoined as provided by this section." And,
"[i]f the division has reason to believe that any person has or is using unfair methods of
competition in commerce or trade, and it appears to the division that it would be in the
interest of the public to stop the unfair methods of competition, the division may begin
adjudicative proceedings and may issue an order directing the person to cease and desist
from using those methods of competition." Additionally, the Act defines "commerce" in
U.C.A. § 13-5-5: Definition of "commerce" as used in this bill shall be construed to mean
intrastate commerce in the state of Utah. Accordingly, under the plain language of the
Act, violations are not limited in scope to price discrimination. And, an action brought
under the Act by a competitor, may involve other methods of unfair competition.
Utah Courts have concurred with the language in the Act. In 2009, a plaintiff
attempted to have the Utah Supreme Court apply the Act beyond anticompetitive
methods for purposes of creating a cause of action for consumers. In rejecting the
plaintiffs request, the Court acknowledged that the Utah legislature only intended to
create a cause of action for competitors, explaining that "Utah's Unfair Practices Act
makes unlawful only c[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce.' Utah Code Ann. §
13-5-2.5(1). Lacking an independent reference to unfair acts or practices, there is no
indication that the Utah Legislature intended the Act to reach any practices beyond
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anticompetitive behavior." Garrard v. Gateway Fin. Services, Inc., 2009 UT 22 \ 9, 207
P.3d 1227, 1230.
Citing Utah Code section 13-5-17 as proof, the Court acknowledged that "This
act shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be subserved.' While this
section does indicate the Division of Consumer Protection may prohibit unfair and
discriminatory practices, the phrase is modified by a reference to preserving competition.
Thus, we find it unambiguous that the legislature intended the Act to apply only to
anticompetitive behavior." Garrard &t f110-11 (citation omitted).
Here, the Act is applicable and the Unfair Business Practices claim was
appropriately brought by Appellant against Appellees because (1) Appellant was a
competitor to Appellees and Appellee organizations, (2) the Act creates a cause of action
when competitors violate the Act to counter the "perpetuation of monopolies and to foster
and encourage competition," and (3) the complaint adequately pleads said violations for
purposes of surviving a 12(b)(6) motion. The complaint alleges that Appellee REALTOR
organizations discriminatorily amended policies and procedures, enforced policies
discriminatorily against Appellant, severed access to MLS properly subscribed to by
Appellant, enforced policies to prohibit use and depreciate the value ofUtahMLS.com to
attempt a purchase at the lower price, and expel Appellant without proper notice or right
to appeal in plain contradiction to procedures and policies. It also alleges that Appellee
competitors orchestrated and allowed the improper use of administrative proceedings to
interrupt Appellant's occupation while also contacting licensees individually for purposes
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of inducing agents into abandoning Bates and by offering incentives per transaction of
agents induced by ERE agents to quisle.
Accordingly, despite Appellees' attempt to limit the scope of the Act beyond the
intentions of the legislature and State Courts, the Act and case law clearly demonstrate
that the Act's scope is within the realm of anticompetitive business practices, like those
carried out by Appellees. Therefore, Appellees' Unfair Practices argument provides
inadequate alternative grounds for which this Court can affirm the lower Court's order
dismissing all claims with prejudice.

D.

Appellant Does Not Lack Standing for Claims Brought Against Brady
Long dba Equity Real Estate and ERE Was Significantly Involved in
Improper Use of Legal Proceedings Claims Brought by Appellant

Brady Long dba ERE asserts that the lower Court's order dismissing all claims
with prejudice should be affirmed because ERE was not involved in improper use of legal
proceedings, and because Appellant lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of AllPro.
Ultimately, ERE's arguments lack merit. First, Appellee's argument fails to recognize
that no claims were brought on behalf AllPro. A fair reading of the complaint would
indicate that real estate agents induced by Appellee Brady Long engaging business under
Bates's principal broker's license. Although agreements between agents and AllPro may
have existed, the contractual and economic interference claims brought by Appellant
relate to economic relations between Bates and said agents. Accordingly, there is no
question that Bates has standing for claims made against Appellees.
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As for Brady Long dba ERE's involvement in improper use of legal proceedings,
Appellee's argument grossly underestimates the involvement of ERE in assisting
Appellant Smalley and others in improperly carrying out the administrative proceeding
against Bates. Ultimately, facts pled with respect to Quent Casperson, Randy Wall, and
Thomas Johnson indicate that they, as employees to ERE were aware of actions taken
against Bates, and suggest that conduct by each, carried out against Bates was not merely
coincidental or insignificant. Accordingly, Appellant does have standing and conduct by
Brady Long was sufficiently pleaded for purposes of surviving a 12(b)(6) motion.

E.

The Statutory Time-Bar for Expulsions from Non-Profit Organizations is
Inapplicable Because No Claims Were Brought Under Said Act

Lastly, Appellees attempt to squeeze a square peg in a round hole by requesting
this Court apply a one-year time-bar for expulsion from non-profit organizations under
the Utah Revised Non-Profit Corporation Act despite the absence of claims pleaded
under the Act.
When pleading a limitations defense, the Appellee has "the burden of proving
every element necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars [Appellant's]
claims." Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105,^jl4, 1 P.3d 558. In Conder, this Court
addressed a defendant's attempt to misapply a statute of limitations under claims not
alleged in the complaint. In response to defendant's argument, this Court opined
[plaintiff] does not allege fraud, and defendants have failed to meet their
burden of proving the action is, nonetheless, somehow a fraud claim. See
Hensley v. Valley Realty Co., 1985 Tenn.App.LEXIS2816, *1 ("The nature
or type of cause of action plead[ed] is determined from the allegations of
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the complaint.")...For reasons previously explained, we will not consider
other statutes of limitation that might bear on [plaintiffs] claim. See also
Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson,,24 Utah 2d 70, 75n.5, 465 P.2d 1007,
1011n.5(1970)(to be considered, the applicable statute of limitation "must
be specifically pleaded");v4merzc<2/? Theatre Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303,
306,80 P.2d 922, 923 (1938)(stating "if the [statute of limitation] pleaded is
not applicable it does not avail defendant that the action may be barred by
another section not pleaded" or proved).
Conder atfflJ16-17.Accordingly, despite Appellees' attempts to mislabel and misconstrue
the complaint for purposes of applying a shorter limitations period, their arguments lack
merit. Because the complaint pleads no cause of action under URNPCA, Appellees'
argument fails to provide this Court with adequate grounds for affirming the lower
Court's order alternatively.

27

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays this Court reverse the lower Court's Order.

s-r.
Respectfully submitted this %l'> day of September, 2012.
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